Two competing approaches to setting risk-based capital (RBC) parameters are the traditional probability of ruin approach and the more recent expected policyholder deficit (EPD) ratio approach. The probability of ruin approach develops capital standards based on a fixed maximum probability of insolvency regardless of risk. The EPD ratio approach allows tradeoffs between the risk of insolvency and the average cost of insolvency so as to force the product of these two numbers, the EPD, to some fixed value. After an explanation of the underlying mathematics, the author develops risk-based capital parameters for private passenger auto liability reserve risk using both methods. The author shows that capital standards developed using the EPD approach increase the risk of insolvency for larger insurers that pose the greatest potential indirect costs to the insurance market through market disruptions in the wake of a major insolvency. These findings have important public policy implications because the EPD approach currently forms the basis for both the Standard & Poor's capital adequacy model and the A.M. Best Company's Best's Capital Adequacy Ratio (BCAR), and it is also used by the American Academy of Actuaries' Risk-Based Capital Task Force as a basis for recommendations to the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) on parameters in the regulatory RBC model.
INTRODUCTION
In response to concerns about the minimum capital standards applicable to insurance companies, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) adopted a regulatory risk-based capital (RBC) formula for property-liability insurers in 1994. The NAIC regulatory RBC formula computes a minimum capital requirement based on each insurer's risk profile. Most insurers, though, actually have much more than the minimum capital required by the NAIC formula. Many considerations affect the actual level of capital, including franchise value, taxes, reinsurance arrangements, and the level of risk aversion within the company. Insurers use internal RBC Michael Barth is assistant professor of finance at Georgia Southern University, Statesboro, Ga. models to help develop optimal capital levels, and those optimal levels are almost always higher than the minimum standards under the NAIC RBC formula. In addition, private rating agencies such as A.M. Best and Standard & Poor's use their own internally developed RBC formulas to evaluate each insurer's capitalization as part of the quality rating process. Therefore, the process of selecting appropriate RBC parameters, whether as part of a regulatory formula, a rating agency formula, or an internal management formula, affects virtually every insurer.
Two of the competing approaches to assigning appropriate RBC parameters to the various risk elements in these RBC formulas are the traditional probability of ruin approach and the more recent expected policyholder deficit (EPD) approach (Bustic, 1994) . This study will compare and contrast these two approaches. In recent years, the EPD methodology has been adopted as the basis for risk parameters in the capital adequacy models both A.M. Best and Standard & Poor's use. The American Academy of Actuaries' Risk-Based Capital Task Force has also used the EPD approach as the basis for recommendations on risk parameters in the NAIC's regulatory RBC formula (NAIC, 1993) . Additionally, internal RBC models used by individual insurance companies may employ either of these approaches or yet another alternative approach. A firm grasp of the underlying mathematics of these approaches is necessary to evaluate the suitability of each approach in developing appropriate capital standards.
This article is organized into four sections. The first section gives general background and descriptions of both the probability of ruin and the EPD approaches to setting capital standards. The second section compares the computation of risk parameters using different assumptions about the underlying risk of a particular insurer. The third section applies these approaches to develop reserve risk parameters for private passenger auto liability loss reserves to illustrate the differences that arise in practical use. The fourth section provides a summary and conclusions concerning these two diverse approaches to setting capital requirements. The author has also included an appendix that addresses discrete probability distribution models of the EPD approach commonly found in the literature.
BACKGROUND
Following the convention in Bustic (1994) , a simplified version of an insurance company demonstrates the ruin and EPD techniques. This article follows Bustic's simplification throughout by treating assets as known quantities and allowing only the liabilities to vary in value. In practice, both the EPD approach and the ruin approach can accommodate stochastic assets and liabilities, and both approaches can also be used to set the parameters for the subcomponents of asset risk and liability risk.
Much of the published discussion concerning the merits of the EPD approach over the ruin approach has used simplistic examples with discrete probability distributions to describe alternatives. These simplistic examples can do more to obfuscate than to explain the true differences in these divergent approaches. Although the Appendix discusses these commonly used examples, the body of this article focuses on the more realistic assumption of a continuous probability distribution to describe the capital position of an insurer.
An insurer is assumed to have fixed assets A and lognormally distributed random liabilities L*, which grow over time at a constant rate m with a standard deviation of s . Since this discussion focuses on loss reserves, the mean growth rate is assumed to be zero because incurred losses represent the best current estimate of all future loss payments. The difference between the fixed assets and random liabilities is its capital, C*, which is also a random variable. A further simplification is the assumption that there are no taxes and that interest rates are zero. Under these assumptions, the present value of assets and liabilities is equal to the realized value. These simplifications have the same relative effect on the computation of capital standards under both the ruin approach and the EPD approach, and in practice both approaches can be adjusted to reflect the time value of money as well as taxes. Under these simplifying assumptions, then, as long as assets are greater than liabilities (A > L*), the insurer is technically solvent. If liabilities turn out to be greater than assets, the insurer is technically insolvent. The degree to which L* can exceed A defines the solvency risk.
Ruin Approach
Under the probability of ruin approach, the level of capital is set so that there is some fixed probability that assets A will be greater than the realized value of liabilities L, which means that there is some non-zero probability that the insurer will become insolvent. The probability of ruin F is the probability that the realized value of liabilities will turn out to be greater than the value of assets and the insurer will be "ruined." The probability that the insurer will remain solvent is (1 -F). As the relative value of assets to expected liabilities (A/E[L*]) increases, the value of F decreases because the liabilities would have to grow by an increasing amount to exceed the value of assets. Assuming a lognormal probability distribution for L* where the expected value of the growth rate of L* is zero and the standard deviation of the growth rate of L* is 0.25, the ruin probabilities are as shown in Table 1 . Under these assumptions, when assets are set equal to the expected value of liabili-
there is a 50 percent chance that the realized value of liabilities will exceed assets and a 50 percent chance that assets will exceed the realized value of liabilities. As the relative value of assets to expected liabilities increases, the probability that liabilities will grow in excess of the value of assets decreases. When assets are equal to 1.5 times the expected value of liabilities, the probability that the realized value of liabilities will exceed 1.5 is 5.24 percent. If the risk standard is set to require that the probability of ruin be no greater than 5.24 percent, the insurer should hold capital equal to at least half of its liabilities. Under the ruin standard, then, the relative value of assets to liabilities is increased until the ruin probability is lowered to a predetermined value.
EPD Approach
The expected policyholder deficit is defined as the expected cost of an insolvency, should one occur. That expected cost is developed by multiplying the probability of an insolvency occurring by the average cost of that insolvency, should it actually occur. This is akin to the basic insurance formula for developing a pure premium: frequency times severity equals average loss cost. The frequency is the probability of an insolvency occurring, and the severity is the expected cost of the insolvency, assuming that it does indeed occur. Continuing with the assumption of fixed assets A and stochastic liabilities L*, the formula for calculating the EPD is:
The EPD is an options pricing model and is essentially identical to the deposit insurance pricing model for banks developed in Merton (1977) . Marcus and Shaked (1984) and Ronn and Verma (1986) have used this approach to set guaranty fund prices in the banking industry, and Cummins (1988) has used it to set fair premiums for insurance guaranty funds. Avery and Belton (1987) provide a comprehensive discussion of the differences between a risk-based capital approach, which in effect controls risk-taking, and a riskbased pricing approach, which does not limit risk-taking but rather sets a price for it. The pricing approach is practical when there is actual risk-sharing, such as exists in a deposit insurance arrangement or in an insurance guaranty fund. It is also appropriate when the goal is to allow risky behavior, assuming that the risk-taker is willing to pay the fair price for taking that risk. An insurer's capital, though, is a form of selfinsured retention in that the company's capital is its protection against becoming insolvent. Risk-based capital is a risk-limiting system, so a risk-pricing model is insufficient to establish appropriate risk-based capital standards. A modification is necessary to change the EPD from what is essentially a risk-financing model into a riskcontrolling model.
One can accomplish this modification by setting capital requirements according to the EPD ratio, which is the EPD divided by the expected value of the liabilities, rather than by the EPD itself. An acceptable EPD ratio (e.g., "a 1 percent EPD ratio" or "a 0.1 percent EPD ratio") is selected, and then the amount of assets required to match that standard are determined through an iterative process. That is, capital is added until the product of the ruin probability (F) and the average cost of ruin given that an insolvency occurs (severity, or S) reach some fixed target, expressed as a percentage of the expected value of the liabilities. The EPD is FxS=D L and the EPD ratio is
Again assuming that L* is lognormally distributed and that the mean growth rate is zero and the standard deviation of the growth rate is 0.25, the EPD ratio is calculated by adjusting A until the EPD ratio reaches the desired level, as shown in Table 2 . If the capital standard is based on an EPD ratio of 0.72 percent, then the insurer needs 1.5 dollars of assets for every dollar of liabilities, or 0.5 dollars of capital per dollar of liabilities.
Note that at 1.5 dollars of assets per dollar of liabilities, the probability of ruin is 5.24 percent and the EPD ratio is 0.72 percent. That is, the probability of ruin capital standard and the EPD ratio capital standard can be made equivalent for a given set of inputs. In this case, a capital standard based on a probability of ruin equal to 5.24 percent is identical to a capital standard based on an EPD ratio equal to 0.72 percent, given that the standard deviation of the growth rate of liabilities is 0.25 and the mean growth rate is zero.
In developing and promoting the EPD approach, Bustic criticized the traditional ruin approach because "[i]t is not sufficient merely to consider the probability of ruin-its severity must also be appreciated" (Bustic, 1994, 660) . The same criticism has been echoed by others as well: "The EPD is an advancement of the probability of ruin concept because it takes into account not only the probability of ruin but also the magnitude of deficit and thus reveals more information about the right tail than simply the probability of ruin." (Wang, 1998, 89) .
These statements imply that the ruin approach incorporates no allowance for the severity of an insolvency, and that is misleading. In fact, the ruin approach does address severity by setting the capital standards so that a specific lower limit is placed on the range of potential severities. As the lower limit on severity is increased to the preselected probability of ruin, the average severity is adjusted as well.
One key difference exists between the capital standards set using ruin theory and the capital standards set using the EPD ratio: the calculation process itself. Unlike capital requirements under the ruin approach, the EPD ratio cannot be calculated directly but instead must be solved iteratively. As capital is added, both the ruin probability (F) and the average cost of an insolvency (S) change. Under the EPD ratio approach, capital is added until the product of the frequency times severity is equal to a fixed percentage of E[L*]. In contrast, under the ruin approach, capital is added until F reaches a predetermined value. Therefore, capital requirements under the ruin approach can be solved directly because only the value for F is incorporated directly in the equation.
COMPARATIVE COMPUTATIONS
Although the EPD ratio approach and the ruin approach can produce identical results for an identical set of inputs, there is divergence in the capital standards produced by these methods when the input values are different. For example, the liabilities of one insurer might be more variable than the liabilities of another insurer. This difference may be attributable to line of business (e.g., a commercial general liability insurer and a commercial fire insurer) or to insurer size.
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This section illustrates how capital standards under these competing approaches diverge as the liability risk changes. Table 3 shows the comparative values of F, S, and the EPD ratio for both the ruin approach and the EPD ratio approach under a variety of assumptions as to the value of the dispersion parameter under the lognormal distribution. The author selected for comparison the 5 percent probability of ruin standard and the 1 percent EPD ratio standard because these are commonly used in practice. Ten different insurance companies of identical size are shown. The only difference between these insurers is that the variability of the growth rate of liabilities is different.
As the standard deviation of the growth rate of liabilities increases from .05 to .50, the ruin approach holds the ruin probability F constant while allowing the average cost of the insolvency S to adjust. Each insurer is held to the same probability of becoming insolvent, but the severity of the higher-risk insurers increases. This in turn causes the EPD to increase as well. The EPD ratio approach, on the other hand, requires both F and S to change as the risk changes while at the same time holding the product of F and S, the EPD, to a constant value. Under the EPD approach, then, increases (decreases) in severity must be offset by decreases (increases) in the frequency to hold the product of frequency times severity constant. The severity parameter under both approaches, although not identical, is an increasing function of the standard deviation of the growth rate of liabilities and is comparable in magnitude under either approach. The real difference lies in the value of F, the probability of ruin. Under the EPD ratio approach, F is inversely related to the standard deviation of the growth rate of liabilities.
Obvious public policy questions arise when considering a risk-based capital approach that forces the relative probability of an insolvency for one insurer to increase simply to offset the fact that the average cost of the insolvency is relatively smaller. In fact, it can be shown that for small values of the dispersion parameter, the EPD approach can produce negative capital requirements by forcing the probability of ruin F above 50 percent to offset small levels of S. Proponents of the EPD approach have argued that the occurrence of small values of the dispersion parameter will not occur in practice. However, when the EPD approach is used to determine risk loadings for subcomponents of risk in the various RBC models, it is not at all uncommon for such 1 The inverse relationship between the variability of reserve estimation error and reserve size has been widely noted and/or modeled in the academic literature over the years. A sample of this extensive body of work includes Hofflander (1966); Weiss (1985) ; Aiuppa and Trieschmann (1987); Pentikainen (1988) ; Derrig (1989) ; Grace (1990); Petroni (1992) ; Barth (1993 Barth ( , 1995a Barth ( , 1995b Barth ( , 1996 Barth ( , 1999 and Daykin, Pentikäinen, and Pesonen (1994) . The law of large numbers also supports the empirical evidence that shows that random error in reserve estimates decreases as reserve size increases. small values to occur. The potential for generating negative capital levels is therefore a serious disadvantage of the EPD approach, but it is also troubling to observe that the insolvency probabilities can differ so markedly from one insurer to the next.
Another potential drawback of the EPD ratio approach is the reliance on direct insolvency costs in the computation of severity. As discussed in Cummins, Harrington, and Niehaus (1993) and in Klein and Barth (1995) , indirect insolvency costs, such as the cost of market disruptions in the wake of an insolvency, are an important consideration in the design of a regulatory risk-based capital system. The potential market disruption from the demise of a large insurer is considerably greater than the market disruption following the demise of a smaller insurer. Therefore, the true severity is understated because of the omission of indirect costs. Since the EPD ratio approach uses an estimate of severity directly in the computation of the capital requirement, the EPD ratio approach produces an understated requirement. Although average severity is indirectly reflected in the computation of capital requirements under the ruin approach, the capital standard itself is based solely on the probability of ruin, and the capital standard is set so that all insurers pose the same probability of becoming insolvent.
APPLICATION TO PRIVATE PASSENGER AUTO LIABILITY RESERVE RISK PARAMETERS
This section applies the ruin approach and the EPD approach to the development of risk-based capital factors for private passenger auto liability reserve development risk. The author chose this line simply because it is the largest line of insurance, but the results are representative of other lines of business. These results illustrate the real-life dilemma regulators and rating agencies face when using these competing approaches to develop capital adequacy models.
Reserve development is assumed to be lognormally distributed with a mean growth rate of zero and a standard deviation of the growth rate that is an inverse function of reserve size. Figure 1 is a scatterplot of actual one-year reserve development against reserve size for 1989 through 1997, using data from annual statements filed with the NAIC. The mean growth rate is zero or near zero, as expected, because insurers are expected to accurately report the loss reserves at the beginning of the year. However, the cone-shaped plot shows that the variability of reserve development is much greater for the smaller-sized reserves. The standard deviation of the one-year-forward reserve estimate growth rate has been estimated using the formula
, where e R is the reported reserve in thousands of dollars.
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The estimated confidence interval (plus or minus two standard deviations) based on this formula is plotted in Figure 1 .
Estimates for reserve sizes of $1 million, $10 million, $100 million, and $1 billion are used to calculate risk-based capital requirements to support one-year adverse loss development under both a 5 percent probability of ruin standard and a 1 percent EPD ratio standard in Table 4 . The table also includes a "worst case" adverse loss development amount that represents the 99.9th percentile of the empirical distribu-2 Derivation of this estimate is explained in Barth (1999) and is based on a process suggested by Beckers (1980) . The sample set includes insurers with at least $1 million in unpaid reserves at the beginning of each calendar year but excludes insurers that were members of an intercompany pooling arrangement and held less than 50 percent of the pool's reserves. To alleviate outlier values, the data in Figure 1 also excludes observations above the 98th percentile and below the 2nd percentile, which left 4,740 observations. tion of adverse development. The worst case amount is indicative of how much capital would be necessary to absorb an extreme level of adverse development. The 50th percentile of the distribution is the point at which the loss reserves grow beyond their expected value, so the area above the 50th percentile represents the range of adverse development. The selection of the 99.9th percentile as the worst case was based on judgment and is included solely to illustrate the amount of capital that might be needed to address a severe event. Table 4 shows that under the EPD ratio approach, the probability of ruin is much greater for a large insurer than for a small insurer. Although the actual severity is greater for the $1 billion reserve than for the $1 million reserve, the relative severity (severity per dollar of reserve) under both the EPD ratio approach and the ruin approach is inversely related to reserve size and similar in scale under both approaches. However, the inverse relationship between the probability of ruin and the relative severity is present only in the EPD approach: an insurer with $1 billion in reserves has an insolvency probability of 0.264 under the EPD ratio standard, while an insurer with $1 million in reserves has an insolvency probability of only 0.075. Under the ruin approach, the probability of insolvency is 0.05 for both. The degree of coverage of the worst case scenario is different as well. Under the ruin method, the ratio of capital to the 99.9th worst case adverse development amount increases with insurer size. Under the EPD ratio approach, it declines.
FIGURE 1 Actual One-Year Growth Rate of Private Passenger Auto Liability Reserves With Estimated 95% Confidence Interval for Calendar Years 1989 Through 1997
Given the indirect costs of an insolvency on the entire economic system (market disruptions, public confidence, etc.), it would be reasonable to hold the larger insurer to a lower ruin probability than the smaller insurer. That is, the probability of ruin should be relatively lower for insurers that pose the greatest threat of disruption to the marketplace. Under the EPD ratio approach, though, the probability of ruin is relatively higher for those large insurers relative to the probability of ruin for those insurers that can be easily absorbed into the current guaranty fund system. In a nonregulatory RBC measurement system, such as the capital adequacy models A. dard & Poor's use, the indirect costs of an insolvency (i.e., market disruption) should also be factored into the formula, which suggests that the EPD approach underestimates the average cost of insolvency, especially with respect to larger insurers, because it understates the true severity.
Similar criticisms can be leveled against the ruin approach, although to a lesser degree. The ruin approach sets the capital standards so that all insurers pose the same probability of insolvency, although not the same level of risk. Again, it may be reasonable to require that larger insurers have relatively lower ruin probabilities than smaller insurers in order to lower the potential for severe market disruptions. The ruin approach is an improvement over the EPD approach in that the probability of insolvency is fixed at some minimum level for all insurers. That is, unlike the EPD approach, the ruin approach does not increase the probability of insolvency for some insurers simply to offset a relatively lower average insolvency cost.
One key advantage of the ruin approach is that capital requirements are always positive. The EPD method produces negative capital requirements in low risk situations. For example, assuming a 1 percent EPD ratio standard, as soon as the severity drops below 2 percent of the value of the expected liabilities, the probability of ruin will have to increase beyond 50 percent so that the product of the probability of ruin and the average cost of the insolvency remains equal to 1 percent of liabilities.
Making the EPD ratio standard tougher (e.g., tightening the standard from a 1 percent EPD ratio to a 0.1 percent EPD ratio) does not correct the size-based imbalance, although it can lower the probability of insolvency below the benchmark used in the ruin approach. Table 5 shows the same calculations as Table 4 , except that Table 5 uses an EPD ratio of 0.1 percent. In this table, the EPD ratio approach develops stronger capital requirements than the 5 percent probability of ruin standard, but the imbalance between larger insurers and smaller insurers still exists. The probability of ruin under the EPD approach is still inversely related to reserve size; a $1 billion insurer has a probability of ruin nearly four times higher than a $1 million insurer. This means that those insurers that pose the greatest threat to the stability of the insurance market system have a relatively greater probability of actually triggering an insolvency.
Additionally, the worst case coverage still declines with size under the EPD ratio standard, meaning that relatively less capital is available to absorb extreme losses incurred by the larger insurer. The range of the potential adverse development for the $1 million insurer ranges from zero (with a 50 percent probability) up to $1,080,000 (at the 99.9 percent probability level). Capital standards using the EPD ratio equal to 0.1 percent in Table 5 require the $1 million insurer to have capital in the amount of $759,000, which is about 70 percent of the worst case adverse development. In contrast, the $1 billion insurer is required to hold $113,890,000 of capital, which will absorb only 55 percent of the worst case adverse development. The ruin method imposes a relatively higher ratio of capital to worst case adverse development for the larger insurers, consistent with the greater threat those insurers pose to the smooth functioning of the marketplace.
Finally, in addition to public policy issues with regard to regulatory RBC models, there are implications for the capital adequacy models developed by A.M. Best and Standard & Poor's, which both use the EPD approach. These capital adequacy mod- els are used to make quality comparisons among insurers, and it might be argued that those who rely on these evaluations to make insurance decisions may place a greater emphasis on the probability of an insolvency than on the severity of an insolvency. That is, insurance consumers are not necessarily risk neutral with respect to insurer insolvency: an insurer with a ruin probability of 10 percent and an expected average direct cost of $1,000,000 is not the equivalent of an insurer with a ruin probability of 90 percent and an expected average direct cost of $111,111. The EPD for both insurers may be $100,000, but the risk is decidedly different.
CONCLUSION
This study highlights some of the practical problems practitioners encounter when employing either method to develop measures of capital adequacy. Traditionally, RBC standards have been determined through evaluation of ruin probabilities, which set capital standards based on some fixed minimum probability that an insolvency will occur. The EPD capital requirement is derived by setting the capital standard based on the average cost of insolvency equal to a fixed value.
The EPD has been promoted as a superior standard because it takes into account both the probability of insolvency (the ruin probability) and the severity of an insolvency (the average cost, should one actually occur) when setting capital standards. Although the probability of ruin approach does not directly address severity, it indirectly addresses severity by adjusting the lower limit of the severity distribution, which in effect alters the expected cost of an insolvency in a manner consistent with the EPD approach. Empirical results show that the behavior of the relative value of the average direct insolvency costs is similar using either method.
Some have argued that the differences in these two approaches are irrelevant, but a careful examination of the underlying mathematics lead to some serious public policy concerns. By requiring that the product of the frequency times the severity remain fixed, the EPD ratio approach can have the perverse effect of setting capital standards that promote insolvency. As the potential severity of an insolvency declines, consistent with a reduction in the underlying risk of the firm, the EPD approach must increase the frequency to maintain the product of frequency and severity at the arbitrarily established level. The inverse relationship between frequency and severity can actually lead to negative capital requirements when the average severity is small.
Many empirical studies have shown that the relative variability of an insurer's liabilities is inversely related to the size of those liabilities. This is also consistent with the law of large numbers, which serves as a basic underpinning of the insurance industry. In practical terms, this inverse relationship between variability and size means that capital standards developed using the EPD ratio approach will generate a relatively higher probability of ruin for larger insurers. From a public policy standpoint, this is exactly opposite to what would be desirable in a regulatory RBC model. The larger insurers pose a relatively greater threat to the stability of the entire system, and the collapse of a single large insurer results in significant indirect costs. If anything, the appropriate regulatory RBC standard would be to require the larger insurers to provide relatively more security rather than less. In effect, the EPD ratio capital standards are lowered to ensure that the calculation of the average insolvency cost includes a greater number of relatively low values. However, the EPD calculation ignores the indirect costs that stem from the insolvency of a large insurer and therefore understates the true cost of an insolvency.
APPENDIX
The body of this article addresses the ruin approach and the EPD approach using a continuous probability distribution, specifically the lognormal. However, existing literature that addresses differences between these diverse methods often uses models that employ discrete probability distributions to support or refute either method. The use of a discrete probability distribution often proves to be deceptive as to the true differences between the two methods. Bustic (1994, 660) Insurer B Scenario 1 13,000 2,000 0.2 2,000 0 Scenario 2 13,000 10,000 0.6 10,000 0 Scenario 3 13,000 18,000 0.2 13,000 5,000 Expectation 13,000 10,000 3,000 9,000 1,000
Both Insurer A and Insurer B have the same ruin probability (20 percent), but Insurer B poses a greater overall cost to policyholders because the severity is greater. The EPD ratio for Insurer A is only 0.002, while the EPD ratio for Insurer B is much higher at 0.100. Insurer B would have to increase its capital to $7,900 to reach the same EPD ratio and the same level of safety as Insurer A.
However, using the same approach but with different numbers, it can be demonstrated that insurers with identical EPD ratios can pose vastly different threats to the system.
In the following example, both insurers have the same EPD ratio, although they have very different ruin probabilities and very different severities. Insurer A has a 10 percent probability of becoming insolvent, but it also has a relatively low severity. In fact, the worst that could happen is that Insurer A would drain $39,000 from policyholders. Insurer B, on the other hand, has a very low probability of insolvency (0.5 percent) but would drain $125,000 from policyholders in the event of an insolvency. Because of the relatively low severity, under the EPD ratio approach Insurer A is allowed to have a ruin probability that is 20 times greater than Insurer B. Both insurers pose the same expected loss on policyholders, at least in dollar terms. However, indirect costs such as market disruption, regulatory costs, inconvenience, loss of public confidence, and instability of the system are not factored into the severity estimate. Further, the purpose of capital is not to pay for an insolvency but rather to prevent one from happening in the first place.
A more extreme example can also be made by using the following example, adapted from an e-mail discussion proposed by Insurer A and Insurer B both have the same EPD ratio of 0.009999, yet Insurer B is virtually certain to become insolvent with a ruin probability of 99 percent. Insurer A, in contrast, has only a 1 percent probability of becoming insolvent. Yet both insurers meet the solvency standards, assuming an EPD ratio of 0.01 percent. In this last example, one can argue that the ruin approach, with a limit of a 1 percent probability of ruin, would be superior to the EPD ratio approach in determining capital because it would require Insurer B to hold at least $1,000,000 in capital.
These examples are not meant to support or refute either method. They are meant to illustrate the ambiguity that arises from using unsophisticated examples to support either approach. In short, the issue is too complex for this type of gross oversimplification.
